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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
HOW COULD ENGLISH COURTS
RECOGNIZE SHARIAH?
JOHN R. BOWEN*
INTRODUCTION
Nowhere in Europe or North America is the legal system closer to
“recognizing” Islamic judgments than in England. In his widely discussed
February 2008 remarks, Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams ex-
plored ways that the legal system might “recognise sharia.”1 He observed
that doing so would require “access to recognised authority acting for a
religious group” and mentioned the Islamic Shariah Council, London, as
such a body.2 Despite the storm of media criticism that emerged in response
to the Archbishop’s comments, Britain’s highest Justice, Lord Phillips,
joined the Archbishop later that year in saying that English law should rec-
ognize certain elements of shariah since shariah seemed to be here to stay.3
These two addresses conveyed an authoritative stamp of approval, but
did not clarify what it means to “recognise sharia.” Part of the confusion
could have resulted from the Archbishop’s juxtaposition of commercial ar-
bitration and family law. In England and Wales these two areas of law have
very different degrees of openness to private dispute resolution.4
Commercial disputes are subject to resolution under the Arbitration
Act 1996; few obstacles stand in the way of a religion-based body carrying
out binding arbitrations of commercial disputes as long as a proper contract
* Dunbar-Van Cleve Professor in Arts & Sciences, Washington University in St. Louis. I
thank Robin Griffith-Jones, Stephen Hockman, Aina Khan, Samantha Knights, Mavis Maclean,
Atif Matin, and Prakash Shah, and the editors of this journal for comments and suggestions.
1. Dr. Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, Archbishop’s Lecture at the Royal
Courts of Justice, Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective (Feb. 7, 2008),
available at http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575 (to be published with commentary in
GOD, ISLAM, AND ENGLISH LAW (Stephen Hockman et al. eds., forthcoming 2011)).
2. Id.
3. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, Lord Chief Justice of Eng. and Wales, Speech at the
East London Muslim Centre: Equality Before the Law (July 3, 2008), available at http://www.
judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/lcj_equality_before_the_law_030708.pdf.
4. I owe this observation to Robin Griffith-Jones. Although for brevity’s sake I will be
referring to “English law” in this paper, the relevant legal jurisdiction is that of England and
Wales. Northern Ireland, and especially Scotland, have their own jurisdictions.
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is drawn up in the presence of a lawyer. One such Islamic body, the Muslim
Arbitration Tribunal (“MAT”), already carries out arbitrations; lawyers and
religious scholars participate at these arbitration sessions.5 The value of this
approach has earned some official recognition: the Charity Commission for
England and Wales, the government body responsible for ensuring that reg-
istered charities, including religious institutions, function smoothly, has
called on the MAT to assist in resolving disputes over the administration of
mosques.6 The legal force of agreements arbitrated by the MAT, however,
rests entirely on the contractual agreement between the two parties and not
on any element of shariah, even in cases where an Islamic moral tone and
Islamic arguments play a practical role in moving the parties toward
agreement.
Family law is the area in which the majority of social and legal con-
cerns have emerged, in response to the suggestion that private Islamic bod-
ies may assume/adopt some of the functions that have historically been the
domain of civil courts. In England the state retains an interest in marriage
and divorce. Marriage must be registered to be recognized in law (despite
beliefs to the contrary, there is no “common-law marriage” in England).
Religious buildings may apply to become places for marriage registration
(although as of 2011 few mosques had this status). Even when uncontested,
divorce cannot be realized through private arbitration, but instead must in-
volve the English legal system. More importantly, if marriage is a contract,
“it is also a status.”7 The state’s special interest in the welfare of children
adds to the difficulty of delegating any element of family law to private
religious bodies. Even when parties arrive at private agreements for a
child’s residence and the division of marital assets, such arrangements may
be challenged at any time in court. Public bodies, such as city councils, may
also intervene if they suspect that the child’s interests are not being ade-
quately protected, which may also lead to a court hearing.
Although some Islamic scholars have urged Parliament to create for-
mal linkages between law courts and Islamic shariah councils, at present
these councils do not have binding legal authority. Several of these councils
5. See the excellent explanation of the Act by Robert Blackett, The Status of Religious
‘Courts’ in English Law, DECISIONS, DECISIONS: DISP. RESOL. AND INT’L ARB. NEWSL. (Howrey,
Wash. D.C.), Dec. 2009, at 11–9.
6. Most notably the resolution of a mosque administration dispute in Waltham Forest in
2009. Conversations with Shamim Qureshi, District Judge in Magistrates’ Court in England (Oct.
2009). See CHARITY COMMISSION, INQUIRY REPORT: THE WALTHAM FOREST ISLAMIC ASS’N (June
28, 2010), http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Library/wfia.pdf. Also see MAT’s website for
its procedures and for references to the Arbitration Act, Arbitration Act of 1996, MUSLIM ARBI-
TRATION TRIBUNAL, http://www.matribunal.com/arbact.html (last visited May 31, 2010) and Pro-
cedure Rules of Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, MUSLIM ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, http://www.ma
tribunal.com/procedure_rules.html (last visited May 31, 2010). It is worth emphasizing that the
MAT does not arbitrate in matters of Islamic divorce.
7. Granatino v. Radmacher, [2010] UKSC 42, ¶ 132, [2010] 3 W.L.R. 1367, 1404 (Baron-
ess Hale of Richmond JSC).
2010] HOW COULD ENGLISH COURTS RECOGNIZE SHARIAH? 413
exist; some act in quite informal ways, while others act with more estab-
lished and publicized procedures. The most prominent council, the Islamic
Shariah Council, London (the “Council”), has existed since 1982, has repre-
sentatives in many large cities, and accepts requests for services in its cen-
tral office in Leyton, eastern London. The Islamic scholars or councilors (as
I shall call them) hold regular open sessions in which Muslims may come to
ask questions about their personal or professional lives, to seek mediation
of disputes (usually between husbands and wives), or to seek an Islamic
divorce—an act entirely separate from civil divorce. When the Council de-
liberates in its monthly formal meetings, it focuses mainly on requests by
wives to dissolve their marriages.8 Their procedures resemble those at the
other highest-profile councils.9
Currently, the main possibility for achieving legal “recognition” of Is-
lamic law in England would be if civil courts were to take notice of, or even
to enforce, some elements of an Islamic divorce proceeding—as we shall
see, they already do take notice of these proceedings occasionally. Islamic
divorce is a complex topic, however, not because the basic ideas are infi-
nitely complicated, but because modern states have created positive-law
versions of Islamic family law, and these Islamic legal systems now exist
alongside long-standing traditions of Islamic legal scholarship and
jurisprudence.
I. ISLAM AND FAMILY LAW IN THE BRITISH POST-COLONY
In debating and deliberating matters of marriage and divorce, Muslims
and non-Muslims in England might refer to one of three distinct sources:
texts of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), laws and legal practices of prominent
Muslim-majority countries, and procedures followed in English Islamic
shariah councils. On any given topic, one may derive quite distinct rules
and procedures from each source, making “recognizing shariah” a compli-
cated affair.
In the rest of this article, I will show how complicated such recognition
would be, firstly, by setting out the range of possible understandings of
“shariah” in the family law arena; secondly, by examining the workings of
the major family-law shariah body (the Islamic Shariah Council, London);
8. All information concerning the Islamic Shariah Council comes from my observations of
sessions since May 2007 and conversations with the councilors and secretary. Additional informa-
tion is available on the Council’s website, ISLAMIC SHARIA COUNCIL, http://www.islamic-sharia.
org (last visited May 31, 2010). The councilors call themselves “scholars” or “ulama,” more rarely
“qadi” or “judges.”
9. Brief overviews of procedures at four councils are given in Samia Bano, Islamic Family
Arbitration, Justice and Human Rights in Britain, 1 LAW, SOC. JUST. & GLOBAL DEV. (AN ELEC-
TRONIC L.J.) (Dec. 6, 2007), http://www.go.warwick.ac.uk/elj/lgd/2007_1/bano. On the Ealing
council, see Mohamed Manjee Keshavjee, Faculty of Law, Alternative Dispute Resolution in a
Diasporic Muslim Community in the United Kingdom (2009) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
London, School of Oriental and African Studies).
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and thirdly, by analyzing a recent civil case in which the judge recognized
the civil-legal effects of Islamic judicial decisions. I draw from these analy-
ses a strongly cautionary note: any form of “recognizing shariah” in English
civil law would require lawyers, judges, and Islamic scholars to take cogni-
zance of Islamic legal traditions, social practices in countries of origin, and
current procedures in England’s shariah councils—for reasons that them-
selves derive from English contract law.
II. ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE
Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) provides the historical basis for the other
two Islamic sources mentioned previously. In classical fiqh, individual
Muslims have the capacity to perform a number of legal acts: they may
marry, divorce, reconcile, make gifts, bequeath, and so on—without involv-
ing an authority.10 Each act, when performed properly, has a legal effect, a
hukm, a word often translated as “law.” For example, a valid marriage
(nikah) occurs if, and only if, a man and woman who are not prohibited
from marrying agree to marry, and marry before witnesses and with the
consent of the woman’s legal guardian. In addition, the groom must give
the bride a marriage gift, the mahr, sometimes called a “dower” in English.
This gift may be a mere token or a considerable amount of cash and jew-
elry, depending on both the common practices in a particular society and on
the wealth or status of the parties involved. The groom may pay some of it
immediately and defer the rest; the deferred part might only come due if the
husband either initiates a divorce or dies. In some Muslim societies—in-
cluding parts of South Asia, from where many British Muslims come—
relatives also contribute large sums of money to buy gold jewelry for the
bride and groom. What happens to these gifts upon divorce can be a matter
of some disagreement.
An Islamic marriage can be dissolved in several ways. A husband can
divorce his wife in the procedure called talaq by uttering a divorce formula.
He can take her back within a specified period, and he may repeat the entire
process one more time, but the third time is final. If he divorces her and
does not reverse his action, then any mahr that has gone unpaid is immedi-
ately due. In some societies (including much of South and West Asia), de-
ferred mahr is often set at a high level. This debt serves to discourage a
husband from divorcing his wife and to give her some leverage in marital
bargaining.11 Upon divorce, the divorcing husband must pay spousal main-
tenance. The mother maintains custody of young children, but the father
must support all the children until such time as their mother remarries. Is-
10. On the basic rules of Islamic marriage and divorce, see JUDITH E. TUCKER, WOMEN,
FAMILY, AND GENDER IN ISLAMIC LAW (2008). An authoritative analysis of shariah is to be found
in WAEL B. HALLAQ, SHAR¯I A`: THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS (2009).
11. In other societies, such as much of Southeast Asia, women’s rights are stronger and mahr
is lower.
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lamic legal theory suggests that this system of rules creates balance between
husbands and wives in their rights and duties.
If a wife asks her husband to divorce her, he will often do so only if
she agrees to pay him something in return, usually any mahr she has re-
ceived, and to forgo her rights to deferred mahr. This procedure is called a
khul’; it can take place with or without the mediation of a scholar or a
judge.
A wife can also demand that their initial marriage contract include a
clause stipulating that if the husband does any one of a list of actions, such
as deserting or mistreating her, then she can activate a talaq. The clause
gives her the power to divorce, although in theory it is the husband who has
done so. Many men refuse to sign such clauses.
Much about marriage and divorce in Islam is contractual and can be
carried out without recourse to a judge. A judge may intervene, however,
either to encourage a husband to divorce his wife or to dissolve a marriage
deemed beyond repair, although doing so has been considered to be a re-
grettable step that should follow efforts to mediate and repair the marriage.
Judicial dissolution or annulment, usually called faskh, thus represents a
third major means of divorce, in addition to talaq and khul’. This judicial
power does not limit or replace the capacities enjoyed by individual Mus-
lims; rather, it adds an additional option to the Islamic repertoire of legal
acts.
III. MODERN ISLAMIC LAW
Today, the majority of Muslims live in countries with modern legal
systems, which are the complex products of colonial imposition and extra-
or post-colonial borrowing.12 Colonial rulers found themselves caught in a
tension between public interest and private sensibilities regarding family
law. On one hand, they sought to create legal rules that could be adminis-
tered relatively easily by judges and rulers. On the other hand, family law
touches people’s sensibilities directly; managing family life was far less of
a priority to colonial administrators than extracting wealth and suppressing
dissent. Rulers cautiously attempted to recognize native systems, and per-
haps to “reform” or to “rationalize” them, but not to replace them alto-
gether. Most post-colonial states have continued this process of gradual
reform.13
12. On modern Islamic family law systems, see TUCKER, supra note 10; LYNN WELCHMAN,
WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND FAMILY LAW: PERSPECTIVES ON REFORM (2004); and, with special refer-
ence to the English legal environment, RAFFIA ARSHAD, ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW (2010).
13. In addition to the South Asia references provided in the next note, see ALLAN CHRIS-
TELOW, MUSLIM LAW COURTS AND THE FRENCH COLONIAL STATE IN ALGERIA (1985); for a
French example, and, for the Dutch in Indonesia, DANIEL S. LEV, ISLAMIC COURTS IN INDONESIA:
A STUDY IN THE POLITICAL BASES OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1973).
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The British experience in colonial India is particularly relevant to mat-
ters of shariah and law in England today. British rulers decided to govern
marriage affairs within each of the religious communities under their rule
by the traditions and laws of those communities. As they extended legal
recognition to more and more of the communities, they created a set of
regulations for each one, which judges and administrators would apply.14
This process resembled Britain’s actions at home, as the government ex-
panded the list of religious communities empowered to perform marriages.
By the nineteenth century, Britain had accorded to Anglicans, Quakers, and
Jews “at home” the right to regulate marriage in their own communities.
Britain first recognized civil marriage in 1837 against this pre-existing
background of religious marriages. Religious marriage rights were extended
to others from an Anglican starting point; the extension was motivated by a
policy of promoting toleration, not one of enforcing secularism.
An additional wrinkle to these British policies continues to reverberate
across the subcontinent. Indian personal status laws were conceived not as
merely positive law, the legal force of which would arise from their enact-
ment, but as restatements of already existing practices. In theory these laws
derived their authority and legitimacy from the “ancient traditions” that
they were supposed to translate into a useable form. The laws were “di-
gests” of material available elsewhere, not “codes” with the ex nihilo force
of statutes.15 A fiction—that law was a window into independently existing
religious norms—continues to permit judges to directly inspect the ancient
traditions to evaluate what they say and how they might be reinterpreted.
The Shah Bano case, where a Hindu Chief Justice looked into the Qur’an to
critique the existing Islamic code, is only the most famous instance.16
The duality of the jurisprudential theory behind personal status laws—
legal form but a scriptural source—has allowed and encouraged religious
scholars to create their own alternative tribunals. If state law simply restates
pre-existing Islamic jurisprudence, there is no reason Islamic scholars or
state-empowered judges should not be able to administer it as well.17 In
1973, the new All India Personal Law Board proposed a model marriage
14. On these processes of recognition and rule, see Nandini Chatterjee, English Law, Brahmo
Marriage, and the Problem of Religious Difference: Civil Marriage Laws in Britain and India, 52
COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 524 (2010) and MARC GALANTER, LAW AND SOCIETY IN MODERN
INDIA 237–58 (Rajeev Dhavan ed., 3d ed. 1997).
15. Chatterjee, supra note 14 passim.
16. Asghar Ali Engineer, The Shah Bano Controversy (1987).
17. A critical moment in the evolution of these practices occurred in 1933, when the leading
Indian religious scholar Ashraf A`li Thanawi called for the creation of local councils of scholars to
give women religious divorces—to stop them from apostatizing in a desperate attempt to dissolve
their marriages. Thanawi had been educated at the reform-oriented Deobandi madrasah in the
scholarship of the dominant Hanafıˆ Sunni Islamic legal school, but he also drew on the Maliki
legal school to support his cause. The Deobandi scholars united in calling for legislation to estab-
lish these tribunals, and many religious schools created such schools on their own. See MUHAM-
MAD QASIM ZAMAN, ASHRAF `ALI THANAWI: ISLAM IN MODERN SOUTH ASIA (2008).
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contract, which stipulated that couples bring marital disputes to a shariah
court (dar al-qada) or its equivalent. In Pakistan, where “Islamization” has
largely resulted from the efforts of Western-trained scholars and officials,
unofficial tribunals have proved to be effective ways of regulating marital
disputes (and of doing so with greater speed and lower costs), although
more recently Islamic divorces have been “fast-tracked” within the state
legal system.18
This set of ideas and institutions has carried over into the practices and
approaches of South Asian Muslims who moved to England. These Mus-
lims brought with them ideas and habits about personal status that had been
developed under British rule of the Indies. They assumed that Muslims
worked out matters of marriage and divorce among themselves, without the
need for state intervention. Islamic scholars creating shariah councils in En-
gland drew from their own experiences in South Asia. In effect they
brought colonial ideas of personal status back home to their legal source.
Different outcomes occurred in other post-colonial contexts. North
Africans brought to France ideas and habits about civil law that were forged
in colonial experience and reinforced by post-colonial judicial reform.
Trained in, or at least accustomed to, the civil law tradition in which all law
is positive, they assumed that marriage and divorce were public, not private
contractual affairs, and that they were properly created through statutes and
the judiciary.19
Matters were still more complicated because these two approaches
stood in very different relation to their respective metropolitan legal sys-
tems. The ideas about marriage and divorce brought to France by North
Africans matched French expectations because they added up to a shared
acknowledgment of the supremacy of state law. “In Tunisia when you are
divorced, you are divorced, period,” said one leading Islamic actor to me in
Paris.20 Law is law, so one sees no shariah councils in France today.
The ideas brought to England by South Asians, however, represented a
sharp challenge to English ideas of a uniform English law. If Muslims han-
dled marriage and divorce themselves, then the civil courts would, in effect,
cede territory to them. Yet for some Muslims, doing so flowed from colo-
18. On state Islamic tribunals in Pakistan and India, see Jeff A. Redding, Constitutionalizing
Islam: Theory and Pakistan, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 759 (2004); Personal Communication with Jeff A.
Redding, Assistant Professor of Law, St. Louis Univ. Sch. of Law (2010); and on non-state tribu-
nals, see Jeff A. Redding, Institutional v. Liberal Contexts for Contemporary Non-State, Muslim
Civil Dispute Resolution Systems, 6 J. ISLAMIC ST. PRAC. INT’L L. 1 (2010), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1648945.
19. See MOUNIRA CHARRAD, STATES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS: THE MAKING OF POSTCOLONIAL
TUNISIA, ALGERIA, AND MOROCCO (2001). Indonesia could have been the third major post-colo-
nial case, but very few Indonesian Muslims moved to the Netherlands.
20. Interview with Hichem El Arafa (June 2009). On the French contrast to England on these
issues, see JOHN R. BOWEN, CAN ISLAM BE FRENCH? PLURALISM AND PRAGMATISM IN A SECULAR-
IST STATE (2010).
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nial practices. “Why don’t they just let us take care of these matters,” said
one Pakistani scholar to me in London; “after all, that’s what they did in
colonial days.”21 Understandably, English judges are reticent to take this
step.
Buttressing such claims by Islamic scholars is the general English
practice of supporting and regulating collective religious identities.
Churches and synagogues may limit attendance at state-aided schools to
members in good standing of the church.22 Civil judges can refuse to com-
plete a divorce process if the religious divorce entered into by the couple
has not run its course.23 Most recently, the new Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom ruled that Orthodox Jewish methods of determining Jew-
ish identity amounted to ethnic discrimination (because identity comes from
a Jewish mother rather than one’s own practice).24 So, efforts to grant legal
legitimacy to judgments of shariah councils resonate with other areas of the
English legal world.
This double set of post-colonial continuities—in treatment of religions
and of personal status laws—made England a particularly likely place for
debates about the possibility of recognizing elements of Islamic family law
in a Western legal system. These debates arose because of institutional ini-
tiatives taken by Muslim public actors starting in the 1980s.
IV. ISLAMIC SHARIAH COUNCIL PROCEDURES
During the 1980s, community-based institutions for resolving disputes
among Muslims gave rise to several broadly-based shariah councils, partic-
ularly in London and the Birmingham area. Today a handful of councils
hold regular meetings and receive petitioners from throughout England and
Wales. These councils generally acknowledge the legitimacy of each
others’ judgments. They publish formalized procedures on their websites. In
differing ways they combine open-ended advice and mediation sessions
with formal deliberations on cases.25
21. Interview with Suhaib Hasan (May 2008).
22. For the most recent government clarification of this policy, see What Are the Changes to
Faith Schools Under the New School Admissions Code?, DEP’T FOR EDUC. (May 20, 2010), http://
www.education.gov.uk/popularquestions/schools/admissions/selectingaschool/a005508/what-are-
the-changes-to-faith-schools-under-the-new-school-admissions-code.
23. Based on the Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act, 2002, c. 27 (U.K.).
24. R v. Governing Body of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15 (appeal taken from Eng.). See Mark Hill,
What the JFS Ruling Meant, GUARDIAN, (Dec. 21, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentis
free/belief/2009/dec/21/judaism-jfs-faith-schools-discrimination.
25. This group of councils includes those at the Birmingham Central Mosque and Birming-
ham’s Green Lane Mosque, that in Dewsbury (Yorkshire), and those located in the London area in
Ealing and Leyton. Each works in an independent way, but scholars at one presume that their
counterparts at another follow proper procedures. There are also a number of other mosques that
draw up divorce certificates, and countless clerics who offer advice. The largest council, in Ley-
ton, also has members who act as regional correspondents, sitting in, among other cities, Bradford,
Leeds, Rotherham, and Birmingham. Journalists and authors of independent reports on the phe-
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The largest and oldest council, the Islamic Shariah Council, London,
has an office in Leyton, in the eastern part of London. Most of its business
relates to divorce. “[Ninety percent] of the marriages cannot be saved by the
time they reach us,” said the Council’s registrar, but the councilors try to
hear both sides of each dispute.26 Young women, and to a lesser extent
men, often fill the waiting room in the Leyton office until they can see one
of the councilors, usually to discuss obtaining an Islamic divorce. Most had
married only in Islamic fashion; those who had registered their marriage (or
married abroad and then sponsored their spouse to enter the United King-
dom) also usually pursue civil divorce.
If a woman files for Islamic divorce, a Council representative will in-
terview her, either at the Leyton office or, if she lives elsewhere in England,
by someone near her home. The Council sends a letter to the husband, noti-
fying him that his wife has filed for an Islamic divorce. He may or may not
reply and may or may not show up for the joint meeting that the council
usually proposes. The Council representative writes a report following each
interview. A file is created, and it eventually reaches a formal monthly
meeting. The councilors hold these monthly deliberations in the Islamic
Cultural Center, located in the complex dominated by the Central London
Mosque next to Regent’s Park. They review case files and, when they have
enough information, give the wife an Islamic divorce.
In most of the cases decided at these formal meetings, both parties
were born overseas, and in most cases either they were married abroad
(usually in Pakistan or Bangladesh) or they were only married in an Islamic
nikah ceremony in England. In many of these cases the husband was living
overseas at the time of the Islamic divorce.27 The councilors do not rule on
the issue of child residence or the division of property, knowing that these
matters will be determined in civil court if they are not agreed to by the
parties. As of late 2010, they generally insist that the wife take four steps:
begin civil divorce proceedings, provide proof that she and her husband
have been separated for at least one year, assure the Council that the hus-
band be able to see their children (if they have any), and, in some cases,
return mahr already paid to her.
First, the councilors insist that the wife who petitions for an Islamic
divorce also begin proceedings to obtain a civil divorce, in cases where the
marriage was registered in the United Kingdom or conducted abroad.28
nomena (few of whom seek to verify their claims) mistake these members for distinct “Islamic
courts,” but in fact the formal judgments of divorce petitions are made in London. See also John
R. Bowen, Private Arrangements: Recognizing Sharıˆ a` in England, BOS. REV. (Mar./Apr. 2009),
http://bostonreview.net/BR34.2/bowen.php.
26. Interview with Atif Matin (May 2010).
27. A quantitative analysis of the Council’s case files is under way; statements about fre-
quency or trends are based on analyses of about 200 cases from two periods.
28. The Council requires the civil divorce in the latter case because often one party had
commenced proceedings to sponsor the residence of the other in the UK and thereby made their
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Once a civil court grants the final divorce decree, the councilors will likely
proceed quickly to grant the wife’s request; they say that the marriage is
over and little sense remains in prolonging its Islamic dimension. The
councilors also wish to work in a way that complements the proceedings of
the civil courts. They know of the existing collaboration between
Rabbinical tribunals and family courts based on the Divorce (Religious
Marriages) Act (2002), which allows civil judges to suspend divorce pro-
ceedings between the decree nisi and the decree absolute (which mark the
two stages of a civil divorce proceeding) if there is an ongoing religious
divorce. The law was motivated by the observation that even after a civil
divorce some Jewish men refused to grant their wives religious divorces.
Currently the law applies only to Jewish proceedings, and the issues facing
Muslim wives differ from those facing Jewish wives. However, for some
shariah councilors the passage of the law suggests that English courts some-
day might recognize their actions as having legal effect, and this idea leads
them to value steps that would bring their own procedures closer to those
followed by civil judges.29
Second, the councilors require that the two parties have been separated
for one year, though some councilors urge that there be a two-year separa-
tion if the divorce is contested. As with the first requirement, this rule
serves a practical function—a way to determine if the divorce request is
serious. Couples must clear a lower bar for the Islamic divorce than the
two-year and five-year separation periods required for most divorces in En-
glish law (depending on whether or not the respondent contests the di-
vorce), but the shariah council rules follow the same logic as the English
legal rule.
Third, if the children live with the mother, and the father has indicated
that he has difficulty getting access to them, the councilors ask the mother
to provide an affidavit stating that she will allow the father to see the chil-
dren. Increasingly the mother swears to this undertaking in the presence of a
solicitor. The councilors require the undertaking partly to converge with
what they think a family court would do in these circumstances, and in part
because they consider allowing both parties to see their children to be an
Islamic norm. Some councilors believe that English family courts tend to
give insufficient weight to the father’s need to see his children and that
consequently they should pay particular attention to this issue.
marriage abroad known to UK authorities. The rule is intended to avoid future legal
complications.
29. Often a mistaken parallel is drawn between the Rabbinical tribunals or Beth Din and the
shariah councils. The Beth Din does not dissolve a marriage; it acts as a witness to a couple’s
decision to do so, much as does a shariah council in the case of a talaq or a khul  ` with the
husband’s consent. But a shariah council may also dissolve a marriage without the husband’s
consent, a power not held by the Beth Din. See THE CENTER FOR SOCIAL COHESION, THE BETH
DIN: JEWISH COURTS IN THE UK (2009), available at http://www.socialcohesion.co.uk/files/12367
89702_1.pdf.
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Finally, the councilors may ask the wife to return any mahr that she
has already received. Usually they propose that she give it to the Council
for safekeeping and notify the husband that he may collect it. If he does not
respond within six months, then the councilors return the mahr to her (or
donate it to a charity upon the wife’s request). Often the wife has also re-
ceived jewelry. When gold jewelry is clearly part of the mahr, they require
her to return it. Otherwise they make no ruling concerning its eventual dis-
position, on grounds that the jewelry and other goods given by one party to
another around the time of the wedding obey local social logics of reciproc-
ity and are not the responsibility of the Council.
The Council determines its own procedures and changes them over
time as councilors develop consensus around a particular issue. For exam-
ple, councilors have long considered the couple’s prior separation to be a
critical element in establishing the seriousness and thus the validity of the
divorce request. In recent years they have tightened the documentation re-
quired in order to prove that the wife and husband had been separated for at
least one year; by 2009 they were asking for written attestations from two
people, each such attestation witnessed by two others. They justify this rule
by invoking the rule’s function, and by saying that when faced with multi-
ple opinions from different schools of Islamic jurisprudence, the Council
needs to establish a single, clear rule. As one scholar said, “We want them
to have been separated for a year, so that we are not hasty.” Councilors
often review the differing opinions emanating from different Islamic legal
schools before revalidating their own rule as a workable compromise.30
V. A PLURALISM OF “ISLAMIC LAW” SOURCES
Three sources for understanding the meaning of the expressions
“shariah” or “Islamic law”—Islamic jurisprudence, modern laws, and coun-
cil procedures—may not only give different answers to a question, but may
also involve quite distinct ideas of “law.” Islamic jurisprudence sets out the
legal effects of actions Muslims might take: do this and you are married; do
that and you are divorced. Each of these claims, that this action has that
effect, is grounded in a text that is either the word of God or a statement or
action by the Prophet Muhammad, along with scholars’ interpretations of
those texts.
Modern Islamic family laws contain rules for marrying and divorcing.
These rules often confirm jurisprudential claims but, in transforming them
into legal rules, they add conditions: do this before a state-appointed judge,
pay this amount, sign this paper, and then you are divorced. These rules
30. Interview with Suhaib Hassan (July 2010). There are various rules about separation prior
to divorce that derive from the several legal schools, and the councilors often invoke these madh-
hab-specific rules, but the procedural rule that they follow is motivated by the consideration de-
scribed here.
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draw on the revealed texts, but take their legal force from the processes that
produce them as statutes or decrees.
Finally, English Islamic shariah councils offer potential clients a set of
procedures that, if followed, will generate a document: do these things and
we will take these steps, and then we may decide to issue you a divorce
certificate that you can use to reassure legal authorities in Muslim countries.
Each council determines its own procedures; they look to Islamic jurispru-
dence, to the legal and social practices in the most relevant Muslim-major-
ity countries, and also to the juridical and practical realities of life in
England in constructing these procedures. They may or may not offer an
Islamic jurisprudential justification of any particular procedure. The council
itself draws its legitimacy from the need for Muslims to have institutions
that can meet their needs and prevent disorder.
In England, Islamic scholars, ordinary Muslims, and English judges
might draw on a mixture of these sources. As in the case examined below, a
judge might ask for expert testimony on “Islamic law,” by which the judge
might mean the general rules of Islamic jurisprudence. Muslims, however,
might enter into a marriage or divorce with assumptions about Islam that
are based on the laws and customs of a particular country. Furthermore, if
they seek an Islamic divorce through an Islamic shariah council in England,
then they might come to see their case through the lens of the procedures
set down by that council. It is in the play of these three kinds of law, each
with its own source of authority, where confusion may reign.
This variety of sources and understandings should indicate how com-
plex a matter it is to speak of English courts “recognizing” Islamic law, as
the Archbishop did. If a judge seeks expertise, what is the object of the
quest: Islamic legal theory, Muslim state practices, or new English-shariah
creations?
VI. WHEN SHARIAH HAS LEGAL EFFECTS: UDDIN V. CHOUDHURY
These are the issues presented in a recent case in which a judge recog-
nized the legal effects of a shariah judgment. The case, Uddin v.
Choudhury, was decided in the Court of Appeal for England and Wales,
Civil Division, at the Royal Courts of Justice, on October 21, 2009.31 The
appeal was from a judgment rendered in the Central London County Court
on March 20 of the same year and concerned gifts that accompanied an
Islamic marriage, or nikah, carried out in 2003 in London. The appellant,
Mr. Uddin, was the father of the groom; the respondent, Ms. Choudhury,
was the bride.
Neither party disputed certain facts in the court proceedings. Both sets
of parents had immigrated to England from Bangladesh, and they had ar-
31. Transcript of Uddin v. Choudhury, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1205, available at http://www.
bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2009/1205.html.
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ranged the marriage in negotiations held between the two families. As usu-
ally is the case, each side gave gifts to the other, including the bride and
groom and also relatives of each as recipients. These gifts included substan-
tial amounts of gold jewelry. The marriage contract, the nikah nama, stated
that the bride was due £15,000 as her mahr and that this was unpaid at the
time of the nikah.
The relationship did not work out. The original plan was to register the
marriage legally sometime after the Islamic ceremony, but this was never
done. Nor, by admission of both parties, was the marriage consummated.
The bride requested that the Islamic Shariah Council in Leyton dissolve the
nikah. The husband agreed to this procedure on condition that his wife re-
turn both the jewelry that had been given to her and the portion of the mahr
that had already been paid to her. She denied having received any mahr. In
December 2004, the Council dissolved the marriage; the Council’s records
show that their decision contained no stipulations concerning jewelry or
mahr.
The husband’s father pursued the matter in civil court.32 He claimed
that the bride was obliged to return the gifts that were given to her and to
return additional items of jewelry worth £25,000, which he claimed she had
taken from his and his son’s home near London during a visit shortly after
the marriage. The bride filed a counterclaim in the civil court. She said that
she was due the £15,000 mahr that was promised in the marriage contract
and payment of which became due when the Council dissolved the mar-
riage. One should keep in mind that this was an Islamic marriage contract
and that the couple never had been married (or divorced) in the eyes of
English law; the court case concerned obligations to pay, not the terms of a
divorce settlement.
The judge appointed a single joint expert on the matter of shariah law
(meaning that both parties accepted him as an expert). The judge asked the
expert, the barrister Faiz ul Aqtab Siddiqi, to inform the court about the
content of “shariah law”—not, notably, to explain Islamic practices as car-
ried out in Bangladesh or at the Islamic Shariah Council. Siddiqi answered
in a detailed brief, in which he made two major points. First, unless stipu-
lated in the contract, the gifts given at or around marriage were gifts, pure
and simple. Their possession was not contingent upon the success of the
marriage and they did not have to be returned upon the marriage’s dissolu-
tion. They were not part of the mahr, whose payment is related to the mari-
tal status of the couple. Second, the bride was due the mahr, to be paid in
full, because the marriage had not been consummated and because this fail-
ure was not due to any refusal on her part. The judge of first instance con-
sidered these two points in making his decisions.
32. He also initiated a civil suit against the Islamic Shariah Council for procedural irregulari-
ties, later dismissed.
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The judge found that the gifts were gifts and need not be returned, and
thus found against the claimant, the groom’s father. The judge also ruled
that the marriage contract was a valid contract and that the Islamic marriage
ceremony had given it “legal effect.”33 The court could and would enforce
the contract. He found for the bride in her counterclaim and awarded her the
£15,000 in mahr.
The groom’s father, Mr. Uddin, immediately appealed, and asked the
appellate court to grant him time to prepare his case. The wheels of justice
turned rather quickly and the appellate judge issued a decision in October
2009. The decision addressed the narrow question of whether the court
would grant Mr. Uddin more time to prepare his appeal, but, in dismissing
this petition, the appellate judge also affirmed the conclusions reached by
the previous judge. He could not judge on the quality of testimony of the
two sides, but he did hold that the original judge had correctly understood
the expert testimony on shariah law, against Mr. Uddin’s several claims to
the contrary. He also ruled that the relevant matters of shariah law on gifts
and mahr, were so clear that he did “not think there [was] a real prospect of
[arguments on] those points succeeding on appeal.”34
This case has generated some interest in the London legal community
because it is one of the few reported cases in recent years to concern the
intersection of Islamic judgments made in England and the legal system. It
includes a number of important claims that are worth summarizing here.
First, the mahr became due upon divorce in this case because it was
specified in the Islamic marriage contract to which the two Bangladeshi
families agreed. The document was to be treated as a straightforward con-
tract, to be taken at face value and to be enforced by civil courts. Second,
the jewelry given at the time of the marriage constituted simple gifts, and
gifts remain with the recipient unless otherwise specified in the marriage
contract. The gifts did not need to be returned. Third, the couple’s nikah
“was a valid marriage under shariah law and that it was then validly dis-
solved by decree of the Islamic Shariah Council.” In other words, the court
recognized the Council’s action as having a legal effect because it triggered
the contractual agreement making the mahr due. “It was valid for the pur-
poses of giving legal effect to the agreement which had been made about
gifts and dowry.”35 It was unnecessary to inquire into the Council’s ruling,
and apparently no one asked further about it in court.
Implicit in the decision was a fourth claim as well, what we could call
a meta-claim: something called “shariah law” applies to all Muslims and an
expert can lay it out in the form of a list of general rules. The expert’s
statements were taken as matters of fact, much as would be another expert’s
33. Uddin, EWCA (Civ) 1205 at para. 11.
34. Id. at para. 13.
35. Id. at para. 11.
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statements about the content of German or French law in a contract case
involving foreign law. His testimony also evokes the way that in Muslim-
majority countries in early modern times a mufti (expert on Islamic law)
would have been asked to restate the law. The court expert in Uddin, like
the early modern mufti, provided a set of empirical statements about what
Islamic law said on the particular topic at hand.
Thus the court construed a number of important acts—giving jewelry
to relatives, promising mahr to the wife, writing a marriage contract, dis-
solving a marriage—as having a clear Islamic content with an English legal
effect. The judge ruled that the gifts stay where they are, the mahr comes
due, the Islamic contract has English legal force, and the Islamic marriage
was validly dissolved. In this sense the decision contains several acts of
“recognition” of shariah law by the civil courts.
VII. IS A MAHR OBLIGATION A CONTRACT?
Each of these acts of recognition, however, merits some further analy-
sis. Let us begin with the Islamic Shariah Council, the body whose dissolu-
tion of the marriage gave rise to these legal effects. The Council dissolved
the Islamic marriage.36 It treated the wife’s petition as a request for a khul’,
which indicates that the wife initiated the divorce action and, according to
their published rules, that she thereby gave up her right to unpaid mahr and
was required to return any mahr already given to her. In this case the
councilors believed the wife’s claim that the mahr had never been paid.
(The husband told the Council that he had paid her the mahr; he changed
his story in civil court.) The Council ruled that she had no obligation to pay
anything to him, but neither was the husband required to pay the promised
mahr.
The Council’s written judgment made no mention of any payments as
conditions for the dissolution of the marriage. This absence of a ruling on
mahr does not appear in the civil court account of what happened, which is
not surprising. The judge would not have seen the relevant Council file, and
even if he had, he would not have remarked on the absence of a stipulation
for mahr payment. Instead, the judge heard the expert testimony, which
indicated that mahr should be paid.
One could take the Council’s reasoning to support the claim made by
Mr. Uddin (the husband’s father) in the civil suit, and summarized by the
appellate judge, Lord Justice Mummery, in the following words: “[T]he
bride was not entitled to claim the mehar or dowry in circumstances where
she had, of her own free will, walked out of the marriage. He says that in
those circumstances the dowry should not be payable.”37 This claim corre-
36. The following section is based on conversations with the Council registrar, Atif Matin,
May 12, 2010, and on analysis of the relevant case file at the Council.
37. Uddin, EWCA (Civ) 1205 at para. 12.
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sponds to Council practices in most cases, but obligations to pay or to re-
turn the mahr depend on the nature of the divorce. If the councilors are
satisfied that a couple did not consummate their marriage and for reasons
other than the wife’s refusal, they award the wife one-half the mahr due. In
the case in question, however, the Council did not render a judgment about
consummation because the parties presented conflicting claims. They
treated the case as an ordinary khul’ case and therefore did not award the
wife any of the mahr.
The civil court did not recognize such a linkage between contractual
obligations and the nature of the divorce. Lord Justice Mummery summa-
rized, approvingly, the trial judge’s findings:
Next he decided that, as evidenced by the marriage certificate,
there was a properly agreed dowry or mehar, and he found, on the
basis of the evidence given by Mr. Saddiqui, that that was a valid
contract which, on the evidence he had heard, was enforceable by
the court. There was no legal reason in the decided cases or in
policy for refusing to enforce an agreement that the parties had
made for the payment of the dowry. So he said that the counter-
claim for the payment of that should succeed and there were no
grounds for making deductions.38
In other words, English law (“decided cases or in policy”) provided the
relevant legal context for determining the husband’s obligation regarding
the mahr, and nothing in the law prevented considering the obligation to be
a contract enforceable by the court.39
VIII. WHAT IS THE CONSIDERATION?
A contract must have consideration; something is promised in return
for the execution of the contract. What is the consideration when a couple
marries in Islamic fashion? Scholars have proposed two responses to this
question. First, that the mahr is the consideration that makes the nikah a
contract. This claim fits the ways in which some South Asian courts have
ruled in disputes over mahr. It implies that the marriage itself is similar to a
purchase of services, however, and for that reason some scholars reject it.
They also claim that the mahr is not essential to the validity of marriage and
thus is not consideration.40
Secondly, that the mahr agreement itself is the contract, and the Is-
lamic marriage is the consideration: I agree to pay you a certain sum of
38. Id. at para. 7.
39. The same position was argued by Ahmad Thomson, a solicitor who also advises the ISC,
in a letter to the Charity Council in 2006 in response to their queries about the ISC’s procedures.
These queries had been sparked by complaints by Uddin to his MP.
40. Such is the position held by Pearl and Menski, who document the prevalence of this
argument in South Asian legal circles but reject it on normative grounds. DAVID PEARL & WER-
NER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 178–79, 190–201 (3d ed. 1998).
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money if we marry.41 Such is the usual interpretation of one of the few
reported English decisions concerning mahr, the 1965 case Shahnaz v.
Rizwan.42 The case concerned a Muslim couple married in India with a
marriage agreement that stipulated payment of mahr upon divorce. The
couple divorced in England and the wife sued for the mahr to enforce the
contract. The judge ruled that “[u]nder Mohammedan law such right to
dower, once it had accrued as payable, was enforceable by civil action and
was regarded as an assignable proprietary right.”43
The Shahnaz way of framing the case insulated the mahr agreement
against two objections: the marriage was potentially polygamous and thus
(following the law at the time) could not be subject to English jurisdiction,
and the agreement was a kind of ante-nuptial contract, not enforceable ac-
cording to English law. In the words of the judge:
This right [to the mahr] is far more closely to be compared with a
right of property than a matrimonial right or obligation, and I
think that, upon the true analysis of it, it is a right ex contractu,
which, whilst it can in the nature of things only arise in connec-
tion with a marriage by Mohammedan law (which is ex hypothesi
polygamous), is not a matrimonial right. It is not a right derived
from the marriage but is a right in personam, enforceable by the
wife or widow against the husband or his heirs.44
IX. WHAT WERE THE PARTIES’ UNDERSTANDINGS?
If the mahr is a contractual obligation, however, and the consideration
in Shahnaz was the Islamic nikah, then the implicit elements of the contract
and the intentions of the parties would need to be read against the back-
ground of normal Islamic divorce proceedings. In English contract law, the
probable intentions of the parties entering into a contract should be taken
into account; in particular the parties must have intended the contract to be
legally enforceable.45 What understandings would the parties in Uddin have
held of those proceedings? What would they have thought the material ef-
fects of dissolving an Islamic marriage would be?
Above, we discussed three possible sources for the parties’ under-
standings: the rules of Islamic jurisprudence, the procedures followed in the
relevant Muslim-majority country, or the procedures followed in England
shariah disputes. The parties to Uddin were of Bangladeshi background.
41. Richard Freeland takes this view with respect to the English court decisions. Richard
Freeland, The Islamic Institution of Mahr and American Law, 4 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 2 (2000–01),
available at http://www.gonzagajil.org/.
42. [1965] 1 Q.B. 390 (Eng.).
43. Id. at 390.
44. Id. at 401.
45. The difficulty of deciding whether a couple intends to be so bound was pointed out in
Balfour v. Balfour [1919] 2 K.B. 571 at 575 (Eng.), where a husband’s promise to pay his wife
maintenance was considered not enforceable.
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They might have brought an understanding to their marriage that any di-
vorce initiated by the wife would be considered as a khul’ and thus, follow-
ing Islamic jurisprudence, would require her to abandon her claim to mahr.
Or they might have known of Bangladesh’s Muslim Family Laws Ordi-
nance and subsequent court decisions holding that mahr contracts are en-
forceable as contracts regardless of the form taken by divorce
proceedings.46 Or, because the wife started Islamic divorce proceedings at
the Islamic Shariah Council, she (at least) could be presumed to have
agreed to abide by their procedures, which stipulate that she would not be
paid mahr if the Council granted her a judicial dissolution.
Whichever set of rules was chosen as a point of reference, the result
would be to embed the mahr contract in a set of shared understandings
about Islamic marriage and divorce, whether these are derived from Islamic
jurisprudence, state legal instruments, or the procedural rules followed by
the Council. English contract law places great weight on such understand-
ings, especially when the contract is among relatives, which renders them
germane to judicial interpretations of the contract in question, the agree-
ment to pay mahr.47
Moreover, the judge might have been expected to consider the parties’
understandings at two distinct moments: at the time of the marriage and at
the start of the Council proceedings. If at the time of her marriage, the wife
had started from the framework of Islamic jurisprudence, perhaps based on
advice from an Islamic scholar, she would have seen any eventual initiation
of divorce proceedings as cutting off the possibility of receiving the de-
ferred mahr. If, however, she had relied on the current law of Bangladesh,
she might have presumed that an eventual divorce, initiated by either party,
would have led her to receive the deferred mahr. At the time of initiating
divorce procedures at the Council, the wife probably would have been re-
quired to sign a statement indicating that she understood that she would
forgo the mahr.
This approach to the question—one that asks about the likely under-
standings the parties would have had of their agreement concerning mahr
within one or another construction of Islamic law—would seem to best re-
spond to the requirements for applying English contract law to a marriage-
related promise between Muslim spouses. Asking this question would lead
to examining the link between the rule of divorce and the rules for mahr
repayment. The judges in Uddin, however, did not follow this logic. In ef-
fect they severed the link between the form of an Islamic divorce and the
mahr obligations.
46. The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (Ordinance No. 8/1961) (Bangl.). See Pearl & Men-
ski, supra note 40, at 373–82; Sultana Kamal, Law for Muslim Women in Bangladesh, 4 DOSSIER
4, 4–6 (Aug./Sept. 1988), http://www.wluml.org/node/248.
47. For this point made in a non-mahr case, see Khan v. Khan, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 399, [46]
(Eng.). I thank Prakash Shah for pointing to the relevance of this case.
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Two problems have emerged so far in our analysis of Uddin. One is
the relationship between the mahr agreement and the form of divorce. If the
contract’s consideration is the decision to enter into an Islamic marriage, as
I have argued above, then the set of rules that define that marriage and
divorce are relevant to how or if the contract is to be understood and en-
forced. The second problem concerns the parties’ intentions. If a judge en-
forced the mahr agreement as a contract, then the judge would wish to
know the parties’ understandings of that contract—whether it would be en-
forced in court, and under what conditions to expect payment of deferred
mahr.
Why did the judges in Uddin not seek to link the status of the mahr
agreement to the parties’—and especially the wife’s—understandings about
marriage and divorce? There are two possible reasons. First, the judge
might have thought that making this link would bring the case into the ter-
rain of prenuptial/ante-nuptial agreement. English judges are not bound to
enforce ante-nuptial agreements, although they may and sometimes do take
them into account in a divorce settlement.48 If a mahr agreement can be
separated from the marriage, then an order for its enforcement is less likely
to be challenged. Although reported cases relevant to Uddin are few and far
between, Shahnaz constructed mahr obligations as enforceable contracts
that did not stand or fall with the acceptability of the marriage regime or the
manner in which a divorce was carried out. (Indeed, in Uddin, there was no
legal divorce at all because there had been no legal marriage.)
In the other generally cited English court decision on the matter, the
1973 case Qureshi v. Qureshi, the judge also awarded mahr. Because the
husband admitted that if their divorce were recognized then the mahr would
be due, the judge explained that he did not need to decide whether it was
due as a simple contractual right or because of the wife’s marital status.49
He also said that the payment of the mahr would be a relevant consideration
for a judge if he or she were asked to adjudicate the wife’s claim for main-
tenance. Here the mahr obligation was treated not as an independent con-
tractual matter but as part of the overall set of obligations flowing from the
divorce. Although this decision is usually taken as having reaffirmed
48. Amendments to the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18, § 24(1)(d) (Eng.), allow them
to do so but do not treat those agreements as contracts. The recent Supreme Court decision in
Radmacher v. Granatino, [2010] UKSC 42, [7] (appeal taken from Eng.), however, introduces as
obiter the view that such ante-nuptial agreements are legally enforceable contracts, subject to the
scrutiny of the court for their fairness.
49. [1972] Fam. 173 at 195. In the broader social and legal context at the time, the more
important aspect of this decision was that extra-judicial divorces carried out in England by persons
domiciled elsewhere could now be accepted, a decision subsequently rendered moot by the Domi-
cile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act, 1973, c. 45, § 5, limiting legal effects of divorces carried
out in England to those that occurred in English courts.
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Shahnaz, it could be interpreted as merging mahr obligations into the over-
all divorce settlement, thus leaving them to the discretion of the judge.50
Second, the initial judge framed the questions put to the expert witness
in terms of “Islamic law” rather than in terms of Bangladeshi practice or the
procedures followed by the Islamic Shariah Council. Islamic law was
treated as a species of foreign law, rather than as the wife’s and husband’s
understandings of Islam. This approach matches that taken by many Mus-
lim scholars, who urge that Islamic law be freed of the cultural elements
that distort its true meaning. The expert witness in Uddin shares this view
and indeed urges women to demand that their marriage contracts contain
sufficiently specific conditions to allow them to initiate a divorce if the
husband fails to fulfill one or another of the marital obligations. As a barris-
ter, Faiz ul Aqtab Siddiqi emphasizes contractual clarity; as an educator at
his Hijaz College in Nuneaton, he emphasizes education. Indeed, in ex-
plaining this emphasis to me, he said that “Nikah is a contract and should be
entered into through education and not based on cultural background, for
example on Pakistani or Indian ideas.”51
This approach, taking Islamic law as a set of contract-oriented rules,
fits well both with English legal expectations that it is a kind of foreign law,
and with efforts to purify Islam of cultural backgrounds. If, however, the
judge does not then investigate the parties’ understandings of their con-
tracts, particularly with respect to the effects of the mode of divorce on
mahr obligations, the judge ignores the English as well as the Islamic ap-
proaches to contracts.52
X. ARE GIFTS TO BE RETURNED?
Mr. Uddin’s petition to the civil court concerned not the mahr but gifts
of jewelry given pursuant to the marriage. The expert testimony declared
them to be simple gifts, not to be returned. The testimony, however, was a
restatement of “Islamic shariah”; it did not purport to describe the under-
standings and practices common in Bangladesh about marriage gifts. These
understandings are complex and changing. In Bangladesh and elsewhere in
South Asia, marriages include the exchange of gifts as well as payment of
mahr. Both sides give gifts of jewelry and clothes, and expensive items of
jewelry are supposed to be handed down to children.
50. Such is Werner Menski’s interpretation of the current state of the law based on his expe-
rience as an expert witness and drawing on unreported cases. Werner Menski, Immigration and
Multiculturalism in Britain: New Issues in Research and Policy (2002) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.casas.org.uk/papers/pdfpapers/osakalecture.pdf.
51. Interview with Faiz ul Aqtab Siddiqi, Principal, Hijaz College (Feb. 2010).
52. On this point I concur with Pascale Fournier in her comparative study of mahr in West-
ern courts. Pascale Fournier, Flirting with God in Western Secular Courts: Mahr in the West, 24
INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 67, 78, 86 (Apr. 2010).
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In Bangladesh the groom’s side is increasingly likely to also demand a
dowry from the bride, which could include requests that the bride purchase
furniture for her husband’s household, where she will live, and that her
family buy jewelry to properly adorn her for the wedding. Though she
wears the jewelry and it “theoretically” belongs to her, often the husband or
his family will use it for subsequent marriages, so that, unlike the mahr,
these gifts cannot be considered the bride’s property.53
In practice, the disposition of these gifts depends on how the marriage
turns out. If it lasts, the children may receive the gifts. Moreover, families
who received gifts will be expected to reciprocate when the gift-givers
marry off their children. Things are viewed differently if the marriage is of
short duration, as was the case with the marriage in the Uddin litigation. As
one prominent South Asian family lawyer explained to me in 2010:
There is an unwritten code that if the bride walks out early (with
no children) she hands back all that she received from the
groom’s side. This is even more the case if the marriage is not
consummated; all is returned to both sides. In an academic jargon
you could say that this is a “constructive trust” and that the givers
had “detrimental reliance” on the marriage. This is a way for the
English courts to recognize this unwritten contract.54
Note that the logic of gifts and obligations invoked here is not one of
Islamic law, nor is it written, and it is decidedly not the logic of a simple
gift. It is a social logic in which gifts create obligations, to the givers as well
as to the receivers. Mr. Uddin followed this logic when he argued that his
son should receive the gifts. The judges saw things through an entirely dif-
ferent lens. They said that unless the marriage contract said otherwise, the
gifts were simple gifts that the wife could keep.55
Now, there is an Islamic way of understanding the gifts that would
support what the court said. It is one that distinguishes between shariah that
can be applied in any society, on the one hand, and the practices and expec-
tations found in South Asia (or in another region), on the other, and that
considers the latter to be outside the competence of a shariah-based deliber-
ative body. The issue is as follows: do the social and legal expectations of
people coming from a particular part of the world have a bearing on how
scholars sitting on a multi-ethnic Islamic council in London decide cases?
Or, are these expectations rather matters of social rules and practices (‘urf )?
The meta-issue is: does ‘urf have relevance for shariah? The issue arises
53. KATY GARDNER, GLOBAL MIGRANTS, LOCAL LIVES: TRAVEL AND TRANSFORMATION IN
RURAL BANGLADESH 178–80 (1995); Shahnaz Huda, Dowry in Bangladesh: Compromising Wo-
men’s Rights, 26 S. ASIA RES. 3, 249, 256 (2006).
54. Interview with Aina Khan, Head of Family Dept., Woodroffes Solicitors (Mar. 2010).
55. Perhaps I should emphasize at this point that my concern is not whether Mr. Uddin
deserved to win the case, but whether the judges correctly grasped the issues surrounding the
marriage and its payments.
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frequently in the deliberations of the Council. In a case they considered on
March 24, 2010, each party asked to be compensated by the other for ex-
penses and gifts. One Pakistani councilor argued that the wife must return
the gold jewelry given to her; another, from Saudi Arabia, did not see how
jewelry was part of their discussion if it was not written down as mahr in
the marriage contract. The discussions continued between the two
councilors:56
Pakistani scholar (“P”): “All [gifts] must be returned, this goes to cus-
tom, all returned, ‘even a needle.’ When she claims her things, she should
take her movables, immovables do not concern us. But gold always con-
cerns the Shariah Council.”
Saudi Arabian scholar (“SA”): “How should we classify these gifts?
Why should they be returned?”
P: “The custom (‘urf) is that the mahr is low but there is lots of gold.
There was one wedding I celebrated of a doctor, and the gentleman asked
me to write down one pound mahr, I was not happy: [I asked] ‘are you
making a mockery of the wedding?’ I asked if they were giving gold, and
they were, quite a lot, and I said they should put that as mahr.”
SA: “Yes, but what does ‘urf do, does it consider this part of mahr?”
P: “Yes.”
SA: “No, our rule is that [only that] which is written in the nikah
nama, you should give it back, it is our rule.”
P: “No it is not our rule, we go with ‘urf.”
In this discussion, the issue was whether gold promised or given
alongside an amount of money should be considered mahr and thus subject
to the rules that apply to mahr in the case of a khul’, or considered outside
the Council’s jurisdiction entirely. The issue resurfaced with respect to
many other cases. P argued that the gold was mahr and that it would be
better if people wrote it down as such, because often that which is explicitly
mahr is laughably low. The amount is symbolic, he explained, and it is the
gold that people intend to provide the bride with bargaining power in future
negotiations with her husband. If you try to accomplish the objectives
(maqaˆsid) of shariah, then you should consider the gold to be part of the
mahr, he concluded.
SA countered that the councilors generally should restrict their judg-
ments to that which is stipulated in the written contract as mahr. He argued
that other gifts, like other property, fall outside the Council’s self-imposed
jurisdictional limitations. In this case SA came to agree with P’s argument
that the gold had been intended to be part of the mahr. His starting point,
however, was that mahr is mahr and gifts are gifts, and gifts have nothing
to do with the Council’s judgments. This also was the expert testimony to
56. Transcript of Audio Tape (on file with author).
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the civil court in Uddin, and as with SA’s position, this argument reflects a
view that seeks to place something called “shariah law” outside of any par-
ticular local set of social expectations.
If we can derive a consensus view from the above debate, it would be
that for the Council, if mahr and gold gifts were clearly distinct at the time
of the marriage, then the disposition of the gifts are not ruled upon by the
Council because the Council only rules on the basis of shariah, not custom-
ary practices. Such would seem to be the case for the Uddin marriage, as
there was a high mahr of £15,000; thus, it would be reasonable to say the
gold jewelry did not enter into the mahr. This statement, however, would
not decide the proper disposition of the gold, i.e., it would not decide be-
tween “gifts are gifts” and “gifts depend on the marriage.” One could say
that the gold was not part of the mahr but also argue that it should be
returned. One cannot decide what to do with the gifts merely by consulting
a generalized version of “Islamic shariah,” as did the judge in Uddin.
If instead we turn to the ‘urf or customary practices and expectations
of the society, then we could formulate a solution for Uddin. The marriage
was short-lived and not consummated, so the parties would return all gifts.
If the civil judges had wished to rule on the basis of shared contractual
expectations, then they could have sided with Mr. Uddin and ordered the
gifts returned. In either case, the judge’s decision has little apparent base
either in the understandings and practices of Bangladeshi Muslims or in the
rules and procedures of the Islamic Shariah Council.
XI. HOW DOES ENGLISH LAW RECOGNIZE A VALID ISLAMIC ACT?
The civil court ratified the decision of the Council in asserting that the
couple’s nikah “was a valid marriage under shariah law and that it was then
validly dissolved by decree of the Islamic Shariah Council.” It was valid not
because the ceremony was recognized in English law, “but it was valid for
the purposes of giving legal effect to the agreement which had been made
about gifts and dowry.”57
How did the two judges reach this conclusion? They referred to the
expert testimony given on Islamic shariah; but in his testimony, the expert,
Faiz ul Aqtab Siddiqi, explained the major rules for divorce but did not
evaluate the decisions made by the Islamic Shariah Council. (No one asked
him to do so and the file would not have been available to him in any case.)
It does not appear that anyone involved in the civil suit would have been in
a position to comment on the validity of the procedures followed by the
Council.
Indeed, on several dimensions parties may disagree as to what consti-
tutes valid procedures. Solicitors in this and other cases may request the
Council to direct all communication through them, on grounds that such
57. Uddin, EWCA (Civ) 1205 at para. 11.
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channels spare their clients undue stress and permit the solicitors to follow
the case. In the eyes of the Council, however, Islamic law requires direct
communication between the councilor and each of the parties. Councilors
see themselves first as mediators, who must pose questions to each party.
Even when solicitors object, councilors continue to engage in direct com-
munication with the parties.
Questions about validity of an Islamic divorce coming from those par-
ties can be easily dismissed as mere lawyers’ tactic. Islamic scholars, never-
theless, reflect critically on how it is that their decisions to dissolve a
marriage are valid. Recall the idea of a khul’ divorce. Theoretically, a khul’
happens when a husband divorces his wife upon her request and usually
when she agrees to return or forgo her mahr. When a wife approaches the
Council, a councilor generally tries to convince the husband to follow this
route. If he refuses to do so, however, can a judge issue a khul’ without the
husband’s consent? The issue divides Islamic scholars. Although the Coun-
cil does precisely this, from time to time one of the councilors voices his
own doubts about the procedure. Some argue convincingly that the majority
of scholars across the four Sunni legal schools (the madhhaˆhib) did not
recognize such “judicial khul’” and that issuing them today is a practical,
unavoidable measure whose Islamic foundations are shaky. Such an argu-
ment holds equally for state-appointed Islamic judges elsewhere and for the
Islamic Shariah Council.58
Given these debates and complexities, it is not completely evident that
an English civil court can decide what counts as a “valid Islamic divorce”
or what the parties are supposed to do with the mahr or gifts of jewelry
based on shariah. There is no single set of rules and procedures to which
judges can refer as comprising “Islamic shariah”—although one can easily
find Islamic authorities who will say that their version of shariah has pre-
cisely this status. Although code books of Islamic law do exist—even the
British wrote them in India—these books are only some among many arti-
facts and interpretations of law and morality that inform Islamic judges and
scholars. For a civil judge to just “have a look” at what shariah law says is a
perilous course as long as there is no agreed-upon general set of rules and
procedures for all shariah councils in England.
Although Islamic scholars disagree on the content of shariah, most
would agree that multiple answers can be considered legitimate if scholars
make reasonable efforts to reach a decision based on knowledge of Islam.
The divergences in the answers stem not only from different readings of
texts and traditions, but also different “meta-ideas” about how one weighs
Islamic jurisprudence, the laws and practices in Muslim-majority countries,
58. Technically these disputes may concern the distinction between a khul ,` as defined here,
and an annulment or faskh. The distinction is important to the Council and will be taken up
elsewhere.
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and the procedures arrived at in England in attempts to adapt shariah to a
new country.
CONCLUSIONS
I have argued that for cases stemming from Islamic marriage and di-
vorce, English law already provides ways to integrate knowledge of social
practices into the process of legal reasoning. If, as in Uddin and following
the decision in Shahnaz, judges treat mahr agreements as contracts, then
they are logically led to inquire as to the intentions of the parties and the
consideration provided. Mahr agreements are contractual but they also are
embedded in a set of social understandings and practices—as are all con-
tracts. These understandings developed out of a shared Islamic jurispru-
dence but they have developed and diverged in today’s world, shaped by
legislation in Muslim-majority countries and by procedural adaptations
such as those found in England’s Islamic shariah councils.
English ideas of contract could also underpin recognitions of Islamic
divorces as “valid,” to the extent that the parties to a religious divorce pro-
cedure sign affidavits agreeing to the terms of the procedure and the range
of possible outcomes. In that case, to affirm validity would not be to com-
pare what is said in “shariah law” and what happened in a particular shariah
council hearing—a difficult and probably unnecessary task—but to see
whether the council obeyed its own procedural rules.
There already are civil cases in which judges “recognize” in some way
the procedures and rules attributed to shariah—Uddin is unique only in that
it was reported. I have argued that there are two ways to think about what
such recognitions mean. One way is to seek a universal set of rules that
constitute “shariah law.” I have argued that this is a chimera. Not even
Islamic legal systems, such as those in Pakistan or Bangladesh, enforce
“shariah law”; they enforce statutes.
The second way, for which I argue, is to draw from English legal re-
sources and common sense the categories and imperatives that respond to
the legal matter at hand. What did the parties think they were doing? What
are the standard ways in which gifts and mahr are given and when are they
returned? How did the shariah council deliberate and decide the case? Are
these procedures what the parties should have expected? In doing so the
courts would not “recognize shariah” but analyze religious procedures—
nikah, mahr, and khul’—into those components that have legal relevance:
promises, expectations, and actions. Judges would then be on firmer
ground.

